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This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce in-
tellectual properties rights (IPR). On the one hand, free-riding on rich countries
technology reduces the investment cost in R&D. On the other hand, it yields a
potential indirect cost: a firm that violates IPR cannot legally export in a coun-
try that enforces them. IPR act like a barrier to entry of the advanced economy
markets. Moreover free-riders cannot prevent other to copy their own innovation.
The analysis, which distinguishes between large and small developing countries,
predicts that small ones should be willing to respect IPR if they want to export
and access advanced economies markets, while large emerging countries, such as
China and India, will be more reluctant to do so as their huge domestic markets
develop. Global welfare is higher under the full protection regime if the developing
country does not innovate. It is higher under a partial regime if both countries
have access to similar R&D technology and the developing country market is large
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1 Introduction
There has always been an international dimension to debates on intellectual property
rights (IPR). However with the integration of the world economy and the liberalization
and privatization of many formers state monopolies, which puts an end to public research
in these sectors, IPR debates have become global. Amongst policy makers, a consensus
emerged that “Western style” IPR legislation should be extended to every other country in
the world. Contrary to Paris and Berne Conventions, that allowed considerable flexibility
in the design of intellectual proterty regimes, TRIPS hence imposes a common framework
for IPR. Their proponents argue that without global IPR innovations would stop in
certain industries. In the absence of international patents, if a product takes considerable
resources to be developed, but can be copied easily, firms will not have enough financial
incentive to invest in R&D. The industries presumably more at risk are those that spend
heavily on R&D (i.e., more than 5% of their sales revenue) such as pharmaceutical,
computers, and communication equipments.
By contrast the detractors of universal IPR argue that they do not stimulate research
to benefit the poor because they are not able to afford the high priced products if they are
developed. Moreover they limit the possibility of technological learning through imitation,
which has been found a key factor of the success of countries such as Taiwan, Korea,
China or India in developing a world class capacity in many scientific and technological
areas including space, nuclear energy, computing, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, software
development and aviation. The following quote from Jeffrey Sachs in 2002 illustrates this
position:
“In the Uruguay Round negotiation, the international pharmaceutical industry pushed
very hard for a universal coverage of patent protection without considering the implications
for the poorest countries. There is little doubt that the new IPR arrangements can make it
more difficult for consumers in the poorest countries to access key technologies, as we’ve
seen vividly in the case of essential medicines.... It also may well be the case that the
tightening of IPRs may slow the diffusion of technology to the world’s poorest countries
that has traditionally come through copying and reverse engineering. Those hallowed
pathways of technological diffusion are increasingly being slowed, and the effects on the
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poorest countries may be unduly hindered. ”
The economic literature on the impact of IPR is also rather inconclusive. It remains
ambivalent as to whether the social benefits of IPR exceed their costs, even in relation
to the developed world. The basic argument in favor of IPR is that they are neces-
sary to stimulate invention and new technologies. The main critic against IPR is that
they increase the cost of patented commodities which reduces welfare. This problem is
exacerbated in developing countries because they are net importers of technology. In-
deed innovative activities are concentrated in a handful of developed countries with top
ten countries accounting for 84 per cent of global R&D activity. In the present paper we
propose a simple framework in which the desirability of using strong IPR can be assessed.
The paper studies the impact of different IPR regimes on the investment decisions
make by private firms in a two (heterogeneous) countries model. We assume that there is a
firm producing a vertically differentiated commodity in each country. Innovation increases
the quality of the commodity. This corresponds to a quality enhancing innovation, for
instance a new generation of mobile phone. The cost of the R&D investment depends
on the efficiency of the R&D process, which by convention is higher in the advanced
economy. More importantly we assume that countries differ in population size and per-
capita income, which are both relevant demand characteristics. This specification allows
us to cover different cases, including small, poor countries such as sub-saharan African
countries, and large, poor countries such as China or India, competing with small or
large, rich countries, such as Norway or the USA. This is new in the literature, where
most papers focus on a uni-dimensional demand: high for rich countries and low for
poor countries. The paper hence shows that taking into account the heterogeneity of
developing countries is crucial for the welfare analysis of IPR. It is not the same to have
a country like Benin to free ride on innovation or a country like China. The incentives of
poor countries to adopt western style IPR differ depending on their capacity to innovate
and on the size of their internal market.
In the model below imitation is costless but yields a potential indirect cost: a firm
that violates IPR cannot export in a country that enforces them. Moreover if one country
does not enforce IPRs, imitation occurs in both countries. There are thus benefits for a
country which enforces IPR to compete with a country that does not enforce them: it
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can freely copy its competitor innovation, if any, while IPR act like a barrier to entry of
its market. We show that independently of the level of efficiency of the national R&D
process, of the size of the interior market and of the country wealth, aggregated investment
level and welfare are always higher under a partial IPR protection regime than under a
regime where there is no protection. One could argue that the no protection regime is not
relevant because rich countries enforce IPR, so at worst partial enforcement regime holds.
This is true only if parallel trade are banned. In the case of parallel imports, such as for
instance the trade of drugs through the internet, the equilibrium is equivalent to the no
protection situation. This equilibrium is very bad, both for investment and welfare.
Although this result suggests that more protection of IPR is better than less, a full
protection of IPR is not always conducive of a higher level of investment. It depends on
the capacity of each country to do R&D. In the asymmetric situation where only the rich
country does R&D, it is true that when the foreign market is sizable, market integration
with full patent protection guarantees the highest level of innovation. However this
result is reversed if the market of the developing country is small. In this case enforcing
strictly IPR in the poor country does not increase the incentives of the firm in the
rich country to invest. As argued by their opponent, uniform IPR are not necessarily
conductive of more investment at the global level, especially when applied to small, poor
countries. Symmetrically when both countries have access to identical R&D technology,
the global level of investment in the full protection regime converges toward the low
level of the no protection regime. The total level of innovation is higher under a partial
protection system. This result arises because investment in R&D boosts demand and
market growth. In equilibrium the demand is enlarged so that the firm invests more
in quality development. The investment level of the two competing firms are strategic
complement.
From a policy perspective, it is not clear whether developing countries will have an
incentive to adopt strong IPR regime, as requested by TRIPS, or not. Governments,
which are negotiating agreements on IPR, focus on their domestic welfare. Starting from
the premise that rich countries have already adopted them, we study the incentives that
poor countries have to follow them. We show that when the R&D system is much more
efficient in the rich country, the developing country chooses to protect IPR only when its
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domestic market is relatively small. In this case it is important for the poor country that
wishes to export its production, to access the foreign market. This can happen only if
it respects IPR. By contrast when the size of its national market is large, the developing
country can afford not to protect IPR, even if this precludes its firm to legally export in
rich country. The paper thus predicts that small developing country should be willing
to respect IPR, while large emerging countries, such as China and India, might be very
reluctant to do so.
It is not true that for the advanced economy the choice of not protecting IPR in
the developing country is necessarily bad. If IPR are effectively respected in the rich
country (i.e., by banning illegal imports), when the developing country chooses to steal
the technology of the rich, this reduces competition in the latter market. At the same
time, if the firm in the developing country also innovates and IPR are not protected, the
firm in the advanced economy can include the innovations developed by its competitor in
its own products. Incremental innovations made by firm in the poor country increase the
stock of innovation offered by firm in the rich country, increasing in turn the demand for
its products and thus its profit. Because of these competition and demand effects, the
full protection regime is best for the rich country when the market of the poor country
is large enough and the rich country has a technological advantage. Otherwise the rich
country is better off with a partial regime. There is thus a potential conflict of interest
between the countries. They fancy opposite policies in many cases. Reaching a consensus
on IPR will be challenging.
Regarding global welfare, the full protection regime is always preferred if the develop-
ing country does not innovate. This result is consistant with the view expressed by the
proponent of strong IPR regimes. When some large countries do not invest in R&D and
totally free-ride on the investment made by others, the global level of investment in R&D
and welfare decline. Yet, if its internal market is large, the developing country is harmed
by enforcing IPR and prefers not to protect innovation. Although it would be socially
desirable, enforcing IPR in the developing country is not an equilibrium. By contrast,
the total welfare tends to be higher under a partial regime if both countries have access
to similar R&D technology and the developing country market is large enough.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature
5
on IPR. Section 3 develops the model. Section 4 presents the benchmark case of a
closed economy. The open economy is studied in section 5, which derives equilibrium
investment levels under different regimes of IPR: none, partial, and full. The welfare
analysis is conducted in section 6. Finally section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Starting with the seminal paper of Grossman and Lai (2004), several macroeconomic
papers have considered the intellectual property protection in a context of horizontal
innovation with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. These papers have a general equilibrium ap-
proach and assume that innovation generates an increase in variety. In all cases patents
induce a static inefficiency due to monopoly pricing. Grossman and Lai (2004) looks at 2
heterogeneous countries: one identifying the North (high innovation, high demand) and
the other the South (low innovation, small demand). They show that the Southern econ-
omy has a lower optimal level of protection at the Nash Equilibrium. Moreover patent
policies are strategic substitutes so that the global equilibrium level of patent protection
is inefficiently low at the equilibrium. Efficiency can hence require to increase the level of
protection of both countries, but harmonization (i.e. equal patent duration and enforce-
ment rate) is not necessary nor sufficient to achieve an efficient outcome. Lai and Qiu
(2003) start from an equilibrium similar to Grossman and Lai (2004): the optimal level
of protection is smaller in the South. The South is also in general worse off if the policies
are harmonized, as preconized by TRIPS. However, a reduction of tariffs in the North
can compensate for this loss and both countries will gain (even more than if North pays
a transfer to the South). For the authors, these results prove the merits of multi-sectoral
negotiations as in the GATT/WTO.
By contrast, our paper, which takes a partial equilibrium approach as common in the mi-
croeconomics literature, focuses on vertical innovation: innovation increases the quality
of a product (and not the number of products). As in the papers cited above, we look at
the choice of intellectual property protection made by firms in developed and developing
countries. However, contrarily to the existing literature, we allow countries to differ both
in size and income. The developing economy can be larger than the developed one (in
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terms of population), although poorer and generally endowed with a less efficient R&D
technology. Innovation can expand the size of the markets and opens the possibility of
conquering new large markets in developing regions. Contrarily to Grossman and Lai
(2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) we find that increasing the level of protection in the less
developed one does not always increase global welfare. We show that an incomplete pro-
tection regime in which the emerging country does not protect innovation can be preferred
and this regime does not need to decrease innovation.
Many papers on IPR study the impact of parallel imports on innovation. In the
presence of parallel imports (or international exhaustion) the possibility to perform price
discrimination is reduced. This may in turn weakens the incentive to innovate. This
view is partially challenged by Grossman and Edwin (2008). Starting from the same
framework as in Grossman and Lai (2004), they show that parallel imports induce the
less innovative country from the South to increase its prices, because it internalizes the
effect of low prices on the incentive to innovate of North’s firms. Other papers find
different results. For instance, Rey, considering price-regulated markets (i.e. pharmaceu-
tical) argues that parallel trade impedes the most innovating country to accept high local
prices to stimulate R&D when a partner has a lower willingness to accept price increases
(less research-oriented). This has adverse effects on innovation. Similarly, Malueg and
Schwartz (1994) and Valletti (2006) find that parallel trade also reduces the incentive to
innovate, while Valletti and Szymanski (2006) show that parallel trade always reduces
investment when price differentials are based on price elasticities (but it may increase
it when they depends on idiosyncratic cost differences). Finally, Li and Maskus (2006)
find that the distortions associated with parallel imports inhibit innovation. This can
harm global welfare, depending on whether the manufacturer was deterring PI with a
high wholesale price. If so, banning such trade would raise expected welfare.
Contrarily to these papers, we do not look to parallel imports, but to the impact of imi-
tation and product market competition. However, we also identity the level of innovation
obtained in the case of complete absence of enforcement of IPR in both countries. In
this case, the imitated good can be sold in the country of origin (not by re-importers
but by the imitator). Our results for this case confirm that innovation would be gener-
ally harmed, but we also show that innovation can be higher than in the case of closed
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economy, depending on the size of the developing economy.
In the growth literature, Aghion et al. (2001) look at the effects of both competi-
tion and imitation on innovation and growth. Contrarily to the classical Schumpeterian
branch of endogenous growth theory, they claim that the incentive to perform R&D de-
pends not on the rents of a successful innovator per se, but rather on the innovator’s
incremental rents (i.e. the difference between the rents of a successful innovator and an
unsuccessful one). Then, a firm that is imitated may face a larger incentive to innovate,
because it is now in neck-and-neck competition with a technologically equal rival. In
our model, imitation may also stimulate innovation, but through a different channel. We
allow the imitator to improve the innovator’s technology. Innovation then expand the
potential demand of both producers, giving incentives to each of them to build on the
other’s innovations. This is reminiscent of Bessen and Maskin, who consider a single
country model and argue that when discoveries are “sequential” (so that each successive
invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and “complementary” (potential
innovator takes a different research line and thereby enhances the overall probability that
a particular goal is reached) IPR protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation
in a dynamic setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off
without such protection. In our model, the total absence of protection generally harms
innovation. However, the fact that the poorer country does not enforce IPR does not
need to decrease innovation.
Saint-Paul (2003) studies an endogenous growth model where a profit-motivated R&D
sector coexists with the introduction of free blueprints invented by philanthropists (“open
source” innovations). He shows that philanthropy does not necessarily increase long-run
growth and that it may even reduce welfare. The reason is that competition coming
from philanthropists crowds out proprietary innovation which on net may reduce total
innovation in the long run.
In our model, we concentrate on imitation. Competition from imitators also “steals busi-
ness” from innovating firm. However we show that the competitive pressure introduced
by imitators does not need to reduce the total level of innovation. This is for two rea-
sons already evoked. First, when imitators have access to a large developing market,
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conquering new market shares can induce an increase in innovation activities even if this
innovation is not protected in the foreign country. Second, we assume that innovation
is incremental and imitators can build on established innovation contributing to increase
the size of the market.
Anton and Yao (2004) analyze firms’ choice of patenting innovation when information
is asymmetric and IPR offer only limited protection. They start from the premise that
patent related disclosure provides competitors with valuable information. They focus
on the innovator’s decision about how much of an innovation should be disclosed (their
analysis starts when the innovation is discovered and all investment financed). They find
that in equilibrium small innovations are patented and fully disclosed while large inno-
vations are kept secret and partially disclosed through a public announcement. Encaoua
and Lefouili (Forthcoming) extend the analysis to the case in which a patent reveals tech-
nological information that lowers the imitation cost relatively to the situation where the
innovation is kept secret and they show the possibility of patenting some large process
innovations whenever imitation is too costly.
In our paper, we restrict the attention to complete information. Still, the characteristics
of the innovating technology and the consequent size of innovations play a role in the
analysis. We explicitly model the initial investment stage and we show that the structure
of R&D costs affects the equilibrium size of the innovations. As a consequence, countries
can choose different protection regimes depending on the characteristics of R&D costs
in the sector. When R&D is very costly in both countries and innovations are small,
imitation also becomes less profitable and the less innovative country prefers to protect
IPR to be allowed to exports its goods in the developed economy (where IPR are well
established). When the cost of innovation is very asymmetric and the size of the devel-
oping country is large, imitation is protected less often. However, this does not always
harm investment (although it can reduce welfare in the most innovating economy).
3 The model
We consider a two countries economy. There is a firm producing a vertically differentiated
commodity in each country. Index i = 1, 2 thus refers indifferently to country i or com-
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modity i. Countries differ in population size and per-capita income, which are relevant
demand characteristics. In the case of a closed economy, demand in country i = 1, 2 is:
pi = ai(vi − biqi) (1)
where vi represents the quality and qi the quantity of good i. In this “quality augmented”
linear demand,1 ai should be interpreted as the per-capita income and bi as the inverse
of the population size of country i.2 This specification allows us to cover different cases,
including small, poor countries (e.g., sub-saharan African countries) and large, poor coun-
tries (e.g., China or India) competing with small and large, rich countries (e.g. Norway
and USA). A parameter which plays an important role in the analysis below is the ratio
ai
bi
. Let define
αi =
ai
bi
. (2)
This parameter reflects the intensity of the demand in country i. It is worth noticing
that there is no clear relationship between αi and development. A poorer (i.e. lower ai)
but more populated country (i.e., higher 1
bi
) can have a higher αi than richer but smaller
country. For instance the interior market of China is bigger than the interior market of
Finland. The model allows us to capture the heterogeneity of both advanced economies
and developing countries.
In a closed economy each firm is in a monopoly position in its respective market.
However when the market is integrated, there is a duopoly in each country. Demand for
good i in country j then writes:
pij = aj(vi − bj(q1j + q2j)) i, j ∈ {1, 2} (3)
where qij is the quantity of good i sold in country j. When goods have the same quality,
they are perfect substitutes. They are not if the varieties produced by the two firms
differ.
1For a discussion of quality augmented models, see Singh and Vives (1984).
2To see this, assume that the indirect utility of a representative consumer consuming a good of quality
v is given by: V (y, q) = u(y) + vq + q
2
2 where q is the quantity and y is the net income y = I − pq.
Solving the consumer’s problem, we obtain p = 1u′(I−pq) (v − q). Then, for pq small, u′(I − pq) is closed
to the marginal utility of income and the (inverse) demand of a representative consumer can be written:
p = a(v − q), with a ≡ 1u′(I−pq) . Then, the demand of a representative consumer can be written:
q = v− 1ap and total demand Q = Nv− Na p where N is the size of the population. We let b ≡ 1N and we
write: P = a(v − bQ). We now denote the price in country i P = pi and the total quantity in country i
Q = qi, obtaining the notation of Equation (1).
10
We set the common level of quality before investment to 1. We assume that innovation
increases the quality of the commodity by φi. This corresponds to a quality enhancing in-
novation, for instance a new generation of mobile phone. The cost of the R&D investment
is ki
φ2i
2
, where ki is an inverse measure of the efficiency of the R&D process in country
i = 1, 2. That is, a larger ki corresponds to a less efficient R&D process. By investing
ki
φ2i
2
a firm increases the quality of the good from vNIi = 1 to v
I
i = 1 + φi. Innovation is
thus deterministic. This assumption simplifies the exposition without altering the results
of the paper. If innovation was stochastic so that the probability of improving the quality
was increasing with the amount invested, the same qualitative results would hold. Finally
once a quality is developed, the marginal cost of productions are normalized to zero for
both firms. Alternatively, we could define pij the price net of marginal costs of firm i,
ci. In this case, an increase in the intercept parameter ai could be both interpreted as
an increase in quality vi or a decrease in the marginal production cost ci. We make the
following technical assumption:
Assumption 1
k2 > k1 >
16
9
(
α2 + α1
)
The first part of assumption 1 (i.e., k2 > k1) simply states that country 1, typically a rich
country, has a better R&D system than countries 2, a poor country. This is done without
any loss of generality. The second part of assumption 1 (i.e., k1 >
16
9
(α2+α1)) guarantees
that our maximization problems are concave, which allows to easily characterize the
optimal levels of investment in all cases.
4 Closed economy
In the benchmark case of a closed economy, there is a monopoly in each country. The
firms maximize their profit with respect to the level of investment in R&D, φi (the level
of quality then is vi = 1 + φi), and the quantity, qi (i = 1, 2).
ΠMi = piqi − ki
φ2i
2
= ai(1 + φi − biqi)qi − kiφ
2
i
2
i ∈ {1, 2} (4)
It is straightforward to check that under assumption 1, the profit function is concave
in qi and φi. The first order conditions (FOC) are sufficient. We deduce easily that in a
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closed economy the private monopoly i = 1, 2 chooses the investment level:
φMi =
αi
2ki − αi (5)
and the quantity:
qMi =
1 + φi
2bi
. (6)
Under assumption 1 one can check that φMi > 0. Since this level of investment
is chosen by a monopoly it is unlikely to be efficient. We compute next the level of
investment that a benevolent planner would choose, taking into account the patent right
of the private firm (i.e., the monopoly power of the firm over price). The social planner
maximizes with respect to φi:
Wi = S
M
i +Π
M
i (7)
Where SMi is consumer surplus Si =
1
2
(avi − Pi(qi))qi evaluated at qMi = 1+φi2bi :
SMi =
αi
8
(1 + φi)
2
and Πi is the profit of the firm:
ΠMi =
αi
4
(1 + φi)
2 − kiφ
2
i
2
(8)
Maximizing (7) with respect to φi we obtain:
φM∗i =
αi
4
3
ki − αi (9)
Comparing equations (5) and (9), it is straightforward to check that the level of
investment chosen by a private monopoly is lower than the level chosen by a welfare
maximizing social planner in the closed economy. The regulator pushes investment up
because in this way she partially offsets the under provision in quantities due to monopoly
pricing.
5 Market integration
In the common market, firms compete in both countries. The timing is as follows: In
the first stage, firms invest in R&D and the quality of the goods is determined. In the
second stage, they compete in quantities. Then, the level of protection of the innovation
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activity influences investment. If both countries protects intellectual property rights
(IPR), imitation is not allowed. Each firm can privately exploits the benefits of its R&D
activity. On the other hand, if one or both countries do not enforce IPRs, imitation
occurs in both countries. Indeed if country i strictly enforces its property rights, it can
still copy the innovation of country j as long as j is not enforcing IPR. Similarly the
firm in country j can imitate the innovation invented in i without paying the investment
cost if there is no IPR in j. For simplicity, we assume that imitation is costless. We
distinguish among three possible regimes:
1. Full patent protection (F): both countries protect patents and the quality after
investment of the good produced by firm i is vFi = 1 + φi.
2. No protection (N): countries do not protect patents and the quality after investment
of the good produced by firm i is vNi = 1 + φi + φj.
3. Partial protection (P): only country 1 protects innovation. Firm 2 imitates, but
it can also invest in incremental innovation. However, because Firm 2 violates the
patents protected in 1, it will not be able to sell in 1, but only in country 2, where
patents are not enforced (we neglect the possibility of illegal imports). We assume
that firm 1 can reproduce the incremental technological improvement developed by
Firm 2. Firm 2 free-rides on the innovation of firm 1 but it cannot, in turn, prevents
firm 1 to use its own innovation. We have vPi = v
N
i = 1 + φi + φj.
After market integration, each country becomes a duopoly, denoted D, except in the
partial regime (P) where the country which enforces strictly IPR forbids importation by
the imitator, and thus stay a monopoly. We assume that exporting in a foreign country
implies a unit transportation cost equal to t ≥ 0. At the second stage, the quantity
produced by firm i in country j is the Cournot quantity:
qDij =
2vIi − vI−i
3bj
+
2t
3aibj
, i,−i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= −i (10)
Where the index −i represents the competitor and the value of vIi depends on the
IPR regime, i.e. vIi ∈ {vFi , vNi , vPi }.
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The total profit of firm i writes:
ΠDi = pi1qi1 + pi2qi2 − ki
φ2i
2
(11)
And welfare of country j:
WDj = S
D
j +Π
D
j (12)
where:
SDj = aj(v1q1j + v2q2j)− ajbj
(q1j + q2j)
2
2
− p1jq1j − p2jq2j
When the market is integrated, innovation allows to increase profits and welfare in
both countries. Moreover the level of investment chosen by firm i will depend on the level
of firm −i.
5.1 The socially optimal level of investment:
We start by computing the optimal level of innovation in the common market, taking
into account the firms market power (i.e., property right). The optimal investment is the
level chosen by a centralized authority maximizing total welfare:
W = WD1 +W
D
2 (13)
A supranational social planner always chooses full disclosure of innovation (i.e. the
no protection regime N). Once the cost of R&D is paid, she has no reason to limit its
diffusion. The socially optimal level of innovation in country i is thus obtained maximizing
(13) with respect to φi and φj (i 6= j). This gives:
φ∗i =
(α1 + α2)− t b1+b22b1b2
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)
kj
k1 + k2
(14)
and
φ∗t = φ
∗
1 + φ
∗
2 =
(α1 + α2)− t b1+b22b1b2
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)
(15)
The optimal level of investment of equation (15) is somewhat a generalization of
equation (9) to the duopoly case with transportation cost. Indeed let consider the case
where transportation costs are negligible (i.e., t = 0). The optimal investment level is:
14
φ∗ =
(α1 + α2)
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)
. (16)
We now turn to the study of the equilibrium level of investment in country 1 and 2.
The private level of investment chosen by firms 1 and 2 depends on the IPR regime. In
case of full protection, firms cannot free-ride on each other investment. Investment costs
need to be duplicated to obtain the same level of quality in both countries. We consider
the three IPR regimes separately.
5.2 Full IPR protection (F regime)
In the case of full IPR protection, the quality of good i after investment is given by
φFi = φi. At the second stage (quantity competition), quantities are given by the Cournot
levels in (10). At the first stage (investment stage), Firm i maximizes the profit (11) with
respect to φi, for a given level of φj, i 6= j. Profit maximization gives the reaction
function:
φi(φj) =
(α1 + α2)(1− φj)− 2bi−bjbibj t
2.25ki − 2(α1 + α2) (17)
We first notice that the slope of the reaction function is negative:
∂φi(φj)
∂φj
< 0.
Quality levels and thus investment levels are strategic substitutes. When i innovates,
quality i becomes more valuable to the consumer. Other things being equal, this decreases
the demand for good j and so firm j’s incentive to innovate. This is a pure competition
effect that passes through substitution. When the goods have different qualities, they are
not perfect substitutes. When the quality of a good is increased, this not only increases
the demand for this good, but decreases the demand for the competitor’s good which
becomes of lower relative quality.3
The slope of the reaction function does not depend on the transportation cost t, which
only affects the intercept of the function. When t = 0, investment does not depend on
3In the alternative version of the model in which innovation decreases costs, the same effect arises.
Without imitation, innovation by firm i makes this firms more efficient than j. This increases its demand
and decreases the one of the competitor (and its incentive to innovate).
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local market characteristics but only on total demand and on the cost of R&D investment
ki. Then, if k1 = k2 firms invest the same amount in R&D and produce the same quality.
When t > 0, an increase in the relative size of demand i (i.e. bj − bi) shifts the reaction
function of firm i upwards. As a consequence, at the equilibrium firm i invests more than
firm j if and only if bi < bj (i.e. the country i has a larger demand size). Then, when
exports are costly, the size of the internal market matters. Firms in larger markets invest
more than competitors operating in smaller ones, even when trade is allowed and firms
can sell their product abroad. Interestingly, this does not occur when per-capita revenue
are asymmetric (ai 6= aj). If the revenue of a country increases, both firms invest more,
but the investment levels remains symmetrical. This can explain why larger countries
tend to invest more in R&D, independently of income levels. For instance, countries
like China and India invest more than smaller countries with similar per capita income
characteristics.
In order to fully characterized the firms’ investment level we assume for simplicity
that the transportation cost is negligible (t = 0). We then have:
φFi =
1
2
(α1 + α2)(1− α1+α23kj )
9
8
k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)(1− α1+α2
3
k1+k2
2
)
kj
k1 + k2
(18)
As expected, the level of quality chosen by firm i depends negatively on ki (measuring
the efficiency of own R&D technology) and positively on kj (the parameter describing
the competitor’s cost of innovation). Comparing equations (18) with (14), one can check
that under assumption 1 the levels of investment in R&D are suboptimal in the case of
full protection of IPR: φF2 < φ
F
1 < φ
∗. This is worse for the less efficient country. This
result is hardly surprising because firms maximize their profit, not the social welfare of
their investment in research. A more interesting issue is whether a weaker enforcement of
the IPR regime degrades the global investment level of each products, or on the contrary
improves it. In what follows we first derive the investment levels achieved in the different
IPR scenario. We next compare them with the F regime.
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5.3 No IPR protection (N regime)
When IPR are not protected, firms can imitate the innovations of competitors at no cost.
The quality of good i after investment is given by φN = φN1 + φ
N
2 . At the second stage
quantities are given by the Cournot levels in (10). At the first stage, profit maximization
gives the reaction functions:
φi(φj) =
(α1 + α2)(1 + φj)− 2bi−bjbibj t
4.5ki − (α1 + α2) (19)
In this case the slope of the reaction function is positive (quality levels and thus
investment are strategic complements).
∂φi(φj)
∂φj
> 0
This result is counter-intuitive. The more the competitor invests the more the national
firm wants to invest in its own R&D activity. The level of investments in innovation
become strategic complements when the firms can free ride on each other. Yet usually
free-riding problems are associated to under investment. When the firms can exploit
the innovations developed by their competitors without loosing the benefit of their own
innovations, to win market shares they tend to invest more when their competitor invests
more. Quality levels are hence strategic complements. Because of imitation, when firm
i innovates this has a positive impact on the demand for good j as well. The size of
the market for the two goods is increased. Then, the incentive of j to innovate is also
enhanced. This effect depends on our assumption that innovation is cumulative and each
firm can build on the innovation developed by the competitor.4
The role played by the transportation cost is equivalent than in the F case. When the
transportation cost is positive, countries with larger population tend to invest more than
smaller ones (everything else being equal). When the transportation cost is negligible
(t = 0) we have:
φNi =
(α1 + α2)
4.5 k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)
kj
k1 + k2
(20)
4In the alternative version of the model in which innovation decreases costs, the same effect would
arise. With imitation, innovation by firm i makes both firms more efficient. This increases net demand
of both firms and thus the incentive to innovate.
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As before investment in country i increases with kj and decreases with ki. We deduce
that:
φN = φN1 + φ
N
2 =
(α1 + α2)
4.5 k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 + α2)
. (21)
Comparing the level of investment committed in the absence of property right protection,
(21), with the optimal level of investment (16), the level of investment is suboptimal in
N : φN < φ∗. Despite the fact that the free flow of innovations stimulates demand and
thus encourages firms to invest more in innovation, firms under invest in R&D compared
to the optimum.
5.4 IPR protection only in one country (P regime)
When only one country protects IPR, foreign firms can imitate the innovation. The
quality of good i after investment is given by φP = φP1 +φ
P
2 . Moreover both firms can sell
in the market in which IPR are not protected. Indeed, IPR is usually well established in
developed countries, while less developed ones have lower incentives/capacity to protect
them. If country 1 protects IPR, imitated goods cannot be exported in 1 (we assume
that illegal imports are banned). Then, if firm 2 chooses imitation, it will sell only in
country 2. Then, firm 1 is a monopoly in country 1 and compete with 2 a` la Cournot in
country 2. At the second stage quantities are given by the Cournot levels in (10). At the
first stage, profit maximization gives the reaction functions:
φ1(φ2) =
(1 + φj)(2.25α1 + α2)− 2 tb2
4.5k1 − (2.25α1 + α2) (22)
φ2(φ1) =
(1 + φ1)α2 +
t
b2
4.5k2 − α2 (23)
In the case of partial enforcement of IPR, investments are strategic complements.
That is, the slope of reaction function is positive for both firms:
∂φi(φj)
∂φj
> 0 i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j.
However the slope is larger for firm 1 because it sells its production in both countries.
By contrast firm 2 sells only in country 2. Nevertheless the investment of firm 1, that it
free-rides, expands its domestic demand. Confronted with a larger demand, the firm 2
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optimally increases its investment level. Since it has no access to the foreign market, its
incentives to invest are lower than that of firm 1.
As before the transportation cost reduces the incentives to invest in R&D of the
exporting firm. With higher transportation cost it is less profitable to export, and thus
to invest in quality improvement. By contrast transportation cost increases the incentive
to invest of the free-rider. Indeed transportation cost acts as a natural barrier to entry.
The larger the transportation cost t and the interior market 2 (i.e., the larger 1
b2
) are,
the bigger is the demand of firm 2, which as a result has a higher incentive to invest in
quality improvement.
When the transportation cost is negligible (t = 0) we have:
φP1 =
(2.25α1 + α2)k2
4.5k1k2 − (2.25α1 + α2)k2 − α2k1 (24)
φP2 =
α2k1
4.5k1k2 − (2.25α1 + α2)k2 − α2k1 (25)
We deduce that the total level of investment under the partial protection IPR regime
is :
φP = φP1 + φ
P
2 =
(α1
2.25k2
k1+k2
+ α2)
4.5 k1k2
k1+k2
− (α1 2.25k2k1+k2 + α2)
(26)
In what follows we compare the different levels of investment achieved under the IPR
regimes, F, N and P, studied above.
5.5 Investment levels under different IPR regimes
We are now ready to compare the total levels of innovation under the different protection
regimes. We establish a first general result.
Proposition 1 Under assumption 1 we have:
φ∗ > φP > φN (27)
Proof. Comparing equation (21) with (26) it is straightforward to check that φP > φN
is equivalent to α1
2.25k2
k1+k2
+ α2 > α1 + α2, which is always trues since k2 > k1. Comparing
next equation (14) with (26), φP < φ∗ is equivalent to 1.125(α1 2.25k2k1+k2 +α2) < 4.5(α1+α2).
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This inequality is always true because 2.25k2
k1+k2
≤ 2.25 under the assumption k2 > k1 ≥ 0.
We have shown earlier that the innovation level is always suboptimal: φ∗ is larger than
all the equilibrium values, φMi , φ
F
i , φ
N , φP , obtained both under closed and open economy.
Market opening and IPR policies have an impact on the investment activities. We would
like to know which framework is the most conducive of a high level of investment. Inde-
pendently of the level of efficiency of the national R&D process, of the size of the interior
market (i.e., of the population) and of the country wealth, aggregated investment level is
always higher under a partial IPR protection regime than under a regime where there is
no protection at all. It tends to suggest, as it is often argued by the proponent of strong
enforcement of IPR policies that, the more protection of IPR there is, the better it is for
global investment. In what follow we show that it is not always the case. In particular
the results very much depends on the capacity of each country to do R&D.
5.5.1 Only the Rich do R&D (k2 →∞)
We first consider the case in which only one firm, by convention the firm of country
1, invests. In many sector, the innovation activity of less developed countries is still
negligible. Innovative activities are concentrated in a handful of developed countries with
top ten countries accounting for 84 per cent of global R&D activity. Many poor countries
do not conduct research at all. We thus assume that the country 2 is less developed
and that firm 2 does not invest in R&D. Technically this is equivalent to consider that
k2 →∞.
When k2 → ∞, the investment level of country 2 converges to zero and φF → φF1 .
When both countries protect innovation (F) the level of investment is:
φF → (α1 + α2)
2.25k1 − 2(α1 + α2) (28)
It can easily be verified that φF > φMi for all admissible values of the parameters. In
the integrated market, the firm invest more than in the closed economy. This is intuitive:
since the market is larger the incentive to invest rises.
Now when no country protects innovation (N) the level of investment becomes:
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φN → (α1 + α2)
4.5k1 − (α1 + α2) (29)
This level of investment is lower than the one obtained in the integrated market
without imitation: φN < φF . However, it can be higher or lower than the monopoly
level of innovation. We have: φN > φMi if and only if α2 >
5
4
α1. Then, even if after
market opening the innovation can be easily imitated, this does not necessary reduce the
incentives to invest of innovation of the national firm. In particular, investment increases
when α2 is large enough. This would describe a foreign market which is seizable (i.e., a
population which is not too poor and/or large enough). Conquering this kinds of markets
pushes to increase innovation, even when innovation can be imitated and reimported (as
in the case of no enforcement of IPR or the existence of parallel trade).
Finally, when country 2 allows imitation but country 1 protects IPR (P).
φP → (2.25α1 + α2)
4.5k1 − (2.25α1 + α2) (30)
We deduce the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that k2 →∞. Under Assumption 1 we have:
φN ≤ φP ≤ φF ≤ φ∗
if and only if either α1 ≤ 4α2 or k1 ≤ 4(α1+α2)(9α1+4α2)9(α1−4α2) .
Proof. By virtue of proposition 2 we know that φN ≤ φP ≤ φ∗. Moreover we already
established that φF ≤ φ∗. We need to show that φP ≤ φF . Comparing equation (30)
with (28) it is straightforward to check that φF > φP is equivalent to 9k1(4α2 − α1) +
4(α1 + α2)(9α1 + 4α2) > 0. We deduce the result.
When only country 1 invests, market integration without strong IPR yields a low
level of investment compared to stronger IPR regimes whenever α1 ≤ 4α2 or when in
case α1 > 4α2, k1 is small enough. In other words when the demand in country 2
is large enough or when it is not too costly to innovate, market integration with full
patent protection (F) guarantees the highest level of innovation. Note that this does
21
not necessarily imply that global innovation is reduced with respect to a closed economy
where the only market is domestic.
The result of Proposition 2 can be reversed if the market of country 2 is very small or
if the cost of innovation is very large. Small markets and negligible investment in R&D
are found in small developing countries, (e.g., in Sub-Saharan Africa). If α2 is very small
and the cost of investment is relatively high (e.g. for α2 → 0, the condition is k1 > 4α1),
enforcing strictly IPR in country 2 does not increase the incentives of firm 1 to invest.
This result is consistent with the view express by the opponent of uniform IPR. They
claim that they are not necessarily conductive of more investment at the global level,
especially when applied to small, poor countries. However the intuition for the result
is different from the arguments usually advanced by those opponents. When country 2
enforces IPR, firm 2 has access to the large market of country 1. It produces a low quality
product that it exports in 1 because, if k1 is relatively high, innovations are small in 1.
Facing competition on its domestic market firm 1 reduces its costly investment in R&D.
5.5.2 Emerging Countries with an Efficient R&D System (k2 → k1)
Emerging economies, such as China and India, have developed very powerful and efficient
R&D systems. In this section we study the investment equilibrium when k2 → k1. In this
case, the solution in an open economy with negligible transportation cost is symmetric
for the two firms. Interestingly the global level of investment in the F regime converges
toward the low level of the N regime. To be more specific, one can check that φF = φN
when k1 = k2, with
φN → (α1 + α2)
2.25k1 − (α1 + α2) (31)
For all k2 > k1 sufficiently close to k1, total innovation is always smaller under N than
under F , but the levels coincides when k2 → k1. Moreover we have:
φP → (9α1 + 8α2)
18k1 − (9α1 + 8α2) .
Since φP > φN , we deduce the next result.
Proposition 3 Assume k2 is sufficiently close to k1. Under assumption 1 we have:
φN < φF < φP < φ∗ (32)
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The total level of innovation is higher (i.e., it is closer to the first best level) under a
partial protection system (P) than under a full protection system (F). When the firm in
country 2 also develops an efficient R&D technology and invests significantly, innovation
is higher if country 2 does not protect IPR. In this case the investment level of the
two competing firms are strategic complement, and an increase of investment by firm in
country 1 is matched by an increase in investment by firm in country 2. This result arises
because investment in R&D boosts demand and market growth. In the Nash equilibrium
played by the two competing firms, the level invested by the competitor is exogenous. It is
a demand booster when the result of the R&D can be copied. In equilibrium the demand
is larger so that the firm invests more in quality development. When the technologies
becomes very similar (k2 → k1), the level of investment under full protection (F) converges
to the level of full imitation (N). In this case, imitation would be preferable from a social
welfare point of view, because it does not reduce the quality of the product available in
the two markets but reduces the total investment costs (it is better when the costs are
not duplicated). This equilibrium does not militate for strong IPR. From the point of
view of global investment partial IPR regime is best.
5.5.3 The general case: k1 < k2 < +∞
When k1 < k2 < ∞, both countries invest, but country 2 has a less efficient technology.
Under all regimes, the investment level of country 2 decreases with k2 (while the invest-
ment of country 1 increases). Then, when k2 is large enough, results approach the case
given for k2 →∞, while when k2 is small the results are closed to the limit case k2 → k1.
An important issue from a policy perspective is what ”large enough” means. To answer
this question and get a sense of which effects dominate, we run simulations.
Let ∆ = k2− k1. The investment levels for three cases are shown in Figure 1. It plots
φF , φN and φP as a function of ∆ for α1 = α2 = 1 and k1 = 16/9(α1 + α2), for k1 = 4,
α1 = 1, α2 = 1/8, and for k1 = 8, α1 = 1, α2 = 1/8.
As Figure 1 illustrates, when the countries have demand of symmetrical intensity, as
in panel (a), the condition of proposition 2 holds. The result obtained for “large k2” starts
to hold for differences in the parameter as low as 10% (i.e. ∆ ∼ 0.3, when k1 = 32/9). In
this case, unless countries have access to very comparable R&D technologies, enforcing
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Figure 1: Innovation levels, φF is in solid line, φN in dotted, φP in dashed.
strong IPR, will generally yield a higher level of global investment.
By contrast when the country 1 has a much larger demand than county 2, the level
of ∆ so that the result of proposition 2 holds, becomes extremely large (panel c). In this
case, a partial protection regime yields a larger level of investment. Moreover it rises
with k1. The next table presents the threshold values of ∆ = k2− k1 so that φF > φP . It
shows that the threshold increases both with k1 and with the difference between α1 and
α2.
α1
α2
= 2
3
α1
α2
= 1 α1
α2
= 3 α1
α2
= 8
k1 =
16
9
(α1 + α2) 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.15
k1 = 5
16
9
(α1 + α2) 0.16 0.25 1.08 ∅
k1 = 10
16
9
(α1 + α2) 0.18 0.29 1.63 ∅
Table 1: Threshold values of ∆ = k2 − k1 such that φP < φF .
6 Welfare analysis and endogenous IPR regimes
IPR regimes are chosen by governments. They make their decision based on domestic
criteria. In this section we focus on the case where country 1 (the advanced economy) has
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a strong IPR regime. The question we aim to address is whether developing countries,
especially fast emerging ones such as China or India, will have an incentive to adopt
strong IPR regime, as requested by TRIPS (section 6.1). We assume that country 2 is
a follower. It takes the IPR regime of country 1 as given. It will choose the protection
regime (F) or (P) which yields the highest national welfare. This in turn will influence
the level of welfare in country 1. Finally we analyze how the country 2 IPR regime choice
affects the welfare of country 1 (section 6.2). This helps us to compute the total welfare
and to check what is the optimal IPR regime from a collective point of view.
Under full protection of IPR (F), welfare in country i = 1, 2 can be written:
W Fi =
1
18
[
3αi
(
2(1 + φFi )
2 + (φFi − φFj )2
)
+ 2αj(1 + 2φ
F
i − φFj )2
]
− ki (φ
F
i )
2
2
(33)
While under partial protection (P) they are:
W P1 =
1
72
(27α1 + 8α2)(1 + φ
P
1 + φ
P
2 )
2 − k1 (φ
P
1 )
2
2
(34)
W P2 =
1
3
α2(1 + φ
P
1 + φ
P
2 )
2 − k2 (φ
P
2 )
2
2
(35)
6.1 Optimal IPR choice of country 2
It can be verified that when k1 (and thus k2) is very large, country 2 is always better off
under (F). Indeed, when R&D is very costly in both countries, only minor innovations
take place. As a consequence, country 2 always prefers to protect IPR (and thus having
firm 2 being allowed to export in country 1) compared to the situation where it enjoys
marginal innovations only in its domestic market. To see this point consider the limit case
k1 → ∞, then φP1 = φP2 = φF1 = φF2 → 0. Substituting these limits values in equations
(33) and (34) we deduce that W F2 −W P2 → 19(3α2 + α1)− 13α2 = 19α1 > 0. By continuity
this dominance result of (F) over (P) still hold for large enough values of k1.
5 When k1
is large, free-riding on country 1 innovation is not worthwhile. Country 2 always chooses
the (F) IPR regime to be able to sell its own production in country 1. However this result
is upset when k1 is small. Let k1 =
16
9
(α1 + α2), be the smallest admissible value of k1 in
our model. The next result shows that when k1 is small, (P) might yield a higher welfare
for country 2 than (F) and thus become an equilibrium.
5In fact simulations show that this result holds for a wide range of k1 (see the appendix).
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Proposition 4 Assume that assumption 1 holds and that k1 =
16
9
(α1 + α2).
• If k2 → k1 then it exists a unique threshold γ0 ≈ 0.865 so that
W F2 −W P2 > 0 ⇔
α2
α1
< γ0
• If k2 →∞ then it exists a unique threshold γ∞ ≈ 0.628 so that
W F2 −W P2 > 0 ⇔
α2
α1
< γ∞
By contrast if k1 is very large then W
F
2 −W P2 > 0 for all α1 and α2.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
The result of Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 2. It shows the welfare levels
obtained by country 2 under (F) and (P), plotted as a function of ∆ = k2 − k1 for
k1 = 16/9(α1 + α2) and the cases α1 = α2 = 1 (panel a), α1 = 1, α2 = 1/3 (panel b) and
α1 = 1, α2 = 1/8 (panel c) respectively.
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Figure 2: Welfare of country 2 under regime (F) (in solid line), and (P) (in dashed line).
Country 2 chooses to protect IPR when α2 is relatively small (i.e., when the domestic
market is small). In this case it is very important for country 2, that wishes to export
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its production, to have access to the market of country 1. This can happen only if
country 2 respects IPR. It thus adopts (F) to be able to trade freely with country 1. By
contrast when the size of its national market is large, country 2 can afford not to protect
IPR, even if this precludes firm 2 to legally export in country 1. This suggests that fast
emerging countries, such as China and India, might become more and more reluctant to
enforce IPR as their potentially huge domestic market develop (i.e., as they move from
panel c to panel a). This effect might be reinforced by the global economic crisis. As
exporting markets shrink for those two countries, they might be tempted to focus more
on their internal demand. In this case they will not care about IPR. We thus expect
small developing country (i.e., low α2) being willing to respect IPR and adopt (F), while
large emerging countries might be very reluctant to do so and rather stick to (N). This
result will be reinforced if illegal imports occur (for instance because it is too costly for
country 1 to enforce IPR). Then country 2 would choose to protect IPR even les often. As
argue by proponents of universal IPR regime, this might discourage innovation in country
1 (as shown in section 5). When IPR is not protected in 1 because of illegal imports,
the situation is equivalent to regime (N), and total innovation is reduced (investments
decease both in 1 and 2). This situation is socially very inefficient.
6.2 Welfare Analysis
In order to compute the total welfare and thus be able to determine what is the optimal
IPR policy from a global point of view we firt compute the welfare of country 1. For
country 1, it is not clear that the choice of not protecting IPR in country 2 is necessarily
a bad thing. If IPR are effectively respected in country 1 by banning illegal imports
from country 2, when firm 2 chooses to steal the technology developed in country 1, this
reduces competition in country 1. At the same time, if firm 2 also innovates and IPR
are not protected in 2, firm 1 can include the innovations developed by its competitor
in its own products. Incremental innovations made by 2 increase the stock of innovation
offered by 1, increasing in turn the demand for its products and thus its profit.
Proposition 5 Assume that assumption 1 holds and that k1 =
16
9
(α1 + α2).
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• If k2 →∞ then it exists a unique threshold γ˜∞ ≈ 0.087 so that
W F1 −W P1 > 0 ⇔
α2
α1
> γ˜∞
• If k2 → k1 then W F1 −W P1 < 0 for all α1 and α2.
Symmetrically if k1 is very large then W
F
1 −W P1 < 0 for all α1 and α2.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates proposition 5. It show the welfare levels obtained by country 1
under (F) and (P), plotted as a function of ∆ = k2 − k1 for k1 = 16/9(α1 + α2) and
α1 = α2 = 1, α1 = 1, α2 = 1/3 and α1 = 1, α2 = 1/8 respectively.
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Figure 3: Welfare of Country 1, W1. Regime (F) in solid line, (P) in dashed line.
Comparing the result of Propositions 4 and 5, it is clear that there are potential
conflicts of interest between the two countries: when k2 is small, country 2 choose to
protect IPR when its domestic market is relatively small, while country 1 would prefer
a partial regime (P), which will allows to exclude firm 2 from market 1. On the other
hand, when k2 is large and its domestic market is big, country 2 chooses the partial
regime (P) more often to free ride on country 1 technology, while country 1 would prefer
a full protection (F) of IPR. The situation corresponds to the pharmaceutical industry
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where countries such as India are producing drugs without respecting IPR. This leads
to conflicts and to the lobbying by western pharmaceutical companies to enforce strictly
IPR at the world level. The situation is reversed when α1 is much larger than α2 (panel
c). In this case country 1 would like partial protection while country 2 will adopt full
protection in order to be able to export and to reach the market of country 1.
We are now ready to study the optimal policy from a collective point of view. We
assume that country 1 has already adopted strict IPR policy. The question we address
is whether it is optimal from the collective point of view that country 2 does the same.
Proposition 6 Assume that assumption 1 holds and that k1 =
16
9
(α1 + α2).
• If k2 →∞ then (W F1 +W F2 )− (W P1 +W P2 ) > 0 for all (α1, α2).
• If k2 → k1 then it exists a unique threshold ˜˜γ0 ≈ 0.012 so that
(W F1 +W
F
2 )− (W P1 +W P2 ) < 0 ⇔
α2
α1
> ˜˜γ0
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 6. It shows the total welfare levels of country 1 plus
country 2 under (F) and (P), plotted as a function of ∆ = k2− k1 for k1 = 16/9(α1+α2)
and α1 = α2 = 1, α1 = 1, α2 = 1/3, α1 = 1, α2 = 1/8 respectively.
From the point of view of total welfare, when country 2 does not do R&D, a strict
enforcement of IPR (F) is always better at the aggregate level. If k2 is large (i.e., it is
totally inefficient), (F) is better from the point of view of country 1 when the market of
country 2 is not too small, while (F) is preferred by country 2 when, on the contrary,
its interior market is small. Starting from a situation of strong enforcement of IPR in
advanced economies, country 2 is not going to willingly enforce them, unless its interior
market is very small. In many cases it will prefer not to protect innovation. Then (F) is
not an equilibrium although enforcing IPR in the developing country would be desirable.
This result is consistant with the view expressed by the proponent of strong IPR regimes.
When some countries do not invest in R&D and totally free-ride on the investment made
by other, the global level of investment in R&D and welfare decline.
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Figure 4: Total Welfare, W1 +W2. Solid is regime (F), dashed (P).
By contrast when country 2 has developed an efficient R&D system, welfare (i.e.,
when ∆ is very small) is higher under a partial system (P) than under a full system
(F), unless α2 is very small. Since developing countries that managed to set up powerful
R&D systems are fast emerging countries with very large interior markets, such as India
or China, the most relevant case is one of a large α2. This result suggests that as an
emerging country moves from zero investment to substantial investment levels in R&D,
partial IPR become more attractive from a global point of view. They are, in this context,
more conducive of a high level of investment and of market and demand growth.
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied in a two countries model the incentives developing countries
might have to enforce IPR. It also studied the impact of their adoption choice on global
innovation and welfare. The analysis illuminates that one size does not fit all. The results
depend both on the maturity of the R&D system and on the size of the developing country
internal market. When developing countries do not have a R&D system, the global level
of investment in R&D and of welfare are higher under strict and uniform IPR regimes.
However with the emergence of new players in the R&D world system, such as China and
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India, the results are reversed: investment levels in R&D and welfare are higher under a
partial IPR.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
Let k1 =
16
9
(α1+α2). By virtue of assumption 1, it is the smallest admissible value of k1
in our model. Substituting k1 in equation (33) and (34) yields:
W F1 =
256(2α1 + α2)(α1 + α2)
2 + 9k2
2(41α1 + 16α2)− 96k2(α1 + α2)(9α1 + 4α2)
8(9k2 − 10(α1 + α2))2 (36)
W F2 =
256α2(α1 + α2)
2 + 9k22(2α1 + 27α2)− 16k2(α1 + α2)(α1 + 31α2)
8(9k2 − 10(α1 + α2))2 (37)
W P1 =
72k2
2(α1 + α2) (351α1
2 + 488α1α2 + 112α2
2)
(64α2(α1 + α2)− 9k2(23α1 + 28α2))2 (38)
W P2 =
1024k2α2(27k2 − 2α2)(α1 + α2)2
(64α2(α1 + α2)− 9k2(23α1 + 28α2))2 (39)
We consider two limit cases: ∆ = k2 − k1 → 0 and ∆ = k2 − k1 → +∞:
• If k2 → k1 = 169 (α1 + α2) then one can check that
W F2 −W P2 =
8 (529α1
3 + 293α1
2α2 − 672α1α22 − 432α23)
81(23α1 + 24α2)2
.
Let γ = α2
α1
. Then W F2 −W P2 > 0 if and only if 529 + 293γ − 672γ2− 432γ3 > 0. It
exists a unique positive root to this third degree equation, γ0 ≈ 0.865. We deduce
that when α2
α1
> γ0, W
P
2 > W
F
2 so that country 2 prefers not to protect IPR.
• If k2 →∞ then one can check that:
W F2 −W P2 =
1058α1
3 − 7717α12α2 − 12808α1α22 − 3408α23
72(23α1 + 28α2)2
Let γ = α2
α1
. ThenW F2 −W P2 > 0 if and only if 1058−7717γ−12808γ2−3408γ3 > 0.
It exists a unique positive root to this third degree equation, γ∞ ≈ 0.628. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
• If ∆→ 0, i.e. k2 → k1 = 169 (α1 + α2):
W F1 −W P1 = −
16 (257α1
3 + 751α1
2α2 + 708α1α2
2 + 216α2
3)
81(23α1 + 24α2)2
< 0
Then, when k2 → k1 Country 1 is better off if Country 2 does not protect innovation.
Thanks to the positive externality of innovations financed by 2 (which in turns can
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be improved by 1), Country 1 is not worse off even though the foreign country does
not protect innovation.
• If ∆→∞, i.e. k2 →∞:
W F1 −W P1 = −
775α1
3 − 7576α12α2 − 14352α1α22 − 5376α23
72(23α1 + 28α2)2
Proof of Proposition 6
• If k2 → k1 tt is easy to check that:
(W F1 +W
F
2 )− (W P1 +W P2 ) =
8(α1 + α2) (5α1
2 − 408α1α2 − 288α22)
27(23α1 + 24α2)2
We deduce (W F1 +W
F
2 )−(W P1 +W P2 ) > 0 if and only if 5α12−408α1α2−288α22 > 0.
Let γ = α2
α1
. The inequality is equivalent to 5 − 408γ − 288γ2 > 0. This second
order equation admits only one positive root: ˜˜γ0 =
√
172224−408
576
≈ 0.012.
• If k2 →∞ then
(W F1 +W
F
2 )− (W P1 +W P2 ) =
(α1 + α2) (283α1
2 − 424α1α2 + 1968α22)
72(23α1 + 28α2)2
.
(W F1 +W
F
2 ) − (W P1 +W P2 ) > 0 is equivalent to 283α12 − 424α1α2 + 1968α22 > 0,
which is always true.
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